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Food Protection and Defense: Preparing for a Crisis 
Caroline Smith DeWaal* 
INTRODUCTION 
On January 30, 2004, George W. Bush declared in a 
Presidential Directive that “We should provide the best 
protection possible against a successful attack on the United 
States agriculture and food system, which could have 
catastrophic health and economic effects.”1  Following this 
statement, the President called for coordination between 
numerous federal agencies, lead by the Department of 
Homeland Security, with significant responsibilities shared by 
the Secretaries of Interior, Agriculture, and Health and Human 
Services and the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency.  But when it comes to food safety, is coordination 
enough?  This article will explore that question and will also 
provide an analysis of the governmental responses to other 
catastrophic events, i.e. September 11 or Hurricane Katrina, to 
improve emergency preparedness. 
As the President’s declaration makes clear, preparing for a 
crisis is best done in advance. In times of crisis, streamlined 
federal agencies and effective response plans greatly increase 
the effectiveness and efficiencies of a response.  They can also 
help minimize public fear by anticipating problems or by 
identifying and addressing them early on.  Effective response 
       ©     2007 Caroline Smith DeWaal.     
        *     Director of Food Safety at the Center for Science in the Public Interest 
(CSPI) in Washington, D.C. and is co-author of Is Our Food Safe? A Consumer 
Guide to Protecting Your Health and the Environment (Three Rivers Press 
2002).  Farida Bhuiya, Lucia Laguzzi, and Erica Newland contributed to this 
article. 
 1. Press release, Office of the White House, Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive, HSPD-9, Subject: Defense of United States Agriculture 
and Food (Jan. 30, 2004), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/02/20040203-2.html. 
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also requires a clear division of responsibility to direct action 
and resources by relevant federal, state and local agencies. 
Following the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center, 
Congress created the Department of Homeland Security, a 
centralized agency that brought together various government 
agencies in order to ensure the safety of our nation from 
terrorist threats.  In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
however, we quickly learned that although our nation might 
have a plan to deal with terrorism, it did not provide guidance 
for addressing other emergencies like extreme weather 
conditions. 
In the late summer of 2005, Hurricane Katrina slammed 
against the Gulf Coast, destroying much of New Orleans and 
many other coastal communities.  This challenged emergency 
response plans and revealed problems at every level of the 
government infrastructure.  Critical gaps in emergency 
preparedness resulted in a cascade of failures.  There were 
interruptions in the chain of delivery for food, water, medicine, 
and other supplies from nationwide sources; disruption of both 
federal and local emergency communications systems; 
inadequate federal response to infectious disease concerns; and 
unclear and inconsistent messages to the public from the 
government.2  A U.S. General Accountability Office (GAO) 
report later underscored that “[r]esponders at all levels of 
government – many victims themselves – encountered 
significant breakdowns in vital areas such as emergency 
communications, as well as obtaining essential supplies and 
equipment.”3 
These disasters amply demonstrate the strengths and 
weaknesses in public health response which is divided among 
many different agencies.  Similarly, recent Escherichia coli 
outbreaks and food recalls have exposed the federal 
government’s limited ability to respond to food borne disease 
outbreaks. Many critical issues have fallen through the cracks 
of agency jurisdiction, compromising emergency response in the 
event of a major contamination event involving the U.S. food 
 2. See SHELLEY A. HEARNE ET AL., READY OR NOT? PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC’S HEALTH FROM DISEASES, DISASTERS, AND BIOTERRORISM 53 (2005), 
http://healthyamericans.org/reports/bioterror05/bioterror05Report.pdf. 
 3. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, STATEMENT BY COMPTROLLER 
GENERAL DAVID M. WALKER ON GAO’S PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS 
REGARDING PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE TO HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA 
3 (GAO-06-365R 2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06365r.pdf. 
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supply, whether intentional or naturally occurring. 
In a 1998 report entitled Ensuring Safe Food from 
Production to Consumption, the National Academy of Sciences 
(NAS) recommended that Congress establish a “unified and 
central framework for managing federal food safety programs, 
one that is headed by a single official and which has the 
responsibility and control of resources for all federal food safety 
activities . . . .”4  The NAS report further described the federal 
programs: “[a]t least a dozen federal agencies implementing 
more than 35 statutes make up the federal part of the food 
safety system. Twenty-eight House and Senate committees 
provide oversight of these statutes.”5 
ROLE OF FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL AGENCIES 
Following September 11, 2001, Congress created a single 
homeland security agency to centralize efforts to protect the 
American people.  While security at airports around the nation 
was taken over by this new agency, the most frequent traveler 
into our homeland, imported food, remained under the 
supervision of a bifurcated federal system of food regulation.  At 
the federal level, numerous agencies have a hand in directing 
food safety, though no agency has overarching authority.  
Though this fragmented network may play to the different 
needs of disparate jurisdictions and industries, as Hurricane 
Katrina demonstrated, such loosely connected departments 
weave a safety net full of holes. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspects all 
meat and poultry products and certain processed egg products.  
The inspection system is based on a law drafted in 1906 
requiring carcass-by-carcass inspection at slaughter plants and 
“continuous” daily inspection at other meat plants.6 The USDA 
is also responsible for promoting meat overseas, ensuring the 
protection of plants and animals from disease (like avian 
influenza) and acting as an advocate for agricultural interests 
in the U.S. Congress. Thus, USDA has two missions when it 
comes to food: safety and promotion. 
The U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) is a public 
health agency charged with protecting the safety of all foods not 
regulated by USDA. The agency regulates about 80% of the 
 4. INST. OF MED., NAT’L RES. COUNS., ENSURING SAFE FOOD FROM 
PRODUCTION TO CONSUMPTION 12 (1998). 
 5. Id. at 26. 
 6. Federal Meat Inspection Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 601-695 (2000). 
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nation’s food supply, including such high-risk products as 
seafood, fruits, vegetables and dairy products. Although the 
foods that FDA regulates are responsible for two-thirds of all 
food poisoning outbreaks, the agency receives only about half as 
much funding as the USDA.7  Thus, FDA-regulated foods – both 
domestic and imported – receive much less oversight and 
inspection than USDA-regulated foods, despite the fact that 
outbreak data show that FDA-regulated foods were the largest 
contributors to outbreaks of food borne illness, far outpacing 
outbreaks and associated illnesses linked to meat and poultry 
products.8 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) is 
another public health agency under the Department of Health 
and Human Services.  The CDC works with state and local 
health departments to track and manage outbreaks of food 
borne illnesses.  In addition, it coordinates FoodNet, a system 
for tracking food borne diseases, and PulseNet, a system for 
genetically fingerprinting isolates of disease agents that has 
revolutionized CDC’s ability to identify multi-state outbreaks. 
With the multitude of federal food safety agencies, 
disparate policies, inadequate resources, and ongoing issues 
with both domestic and imported foods, the problems with 
coordination during an emergency could become quite critical.  
Meanwhile, President Bush’s federal budget for the 2006 fiscal 
year cut funding for public health programs managed by the 
Department for Health and Human Services by over $1 billion.9  
The 2007 proposed budget included an additional $600 million 
cut.10 
 7. USDA, FY 2005 BUDGET SUMMARY, 65 (n.d.), available at 
http://www.usda.gov/agency/obpa/Budget-Summary/2005/FY05budsum.pdf 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007); U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF 
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT, FY 2006 BUDGET SUMMARY AND BUDGET IN BRIEF: 
COMPARABLE ALL PURPOSE TABLE, PROGRAM LEVEL (n.d.), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/oc/oms/ofm/budget/2006/HTML/Tables/compAPTPL.htm 
(last visited Jan. 29, 2007). 
 8. Sixty-six percent of all outbreaks in the CSPI Outbreak Alert database 
were caused by foods regulated by the FDA; the remaining 27% were caused by 
foods regulated by the USDA (meat and poultry products); and 7% were caused 
by foods regulated in part by both agencies. CAROLINE SMITH DEWAAL ET AL., 
OUTBREAK ALERT!: CLOSING THE GAPS IN OUR FEDERAL FOOD-SAFETY NET (8th 
ed. 2006), available at http://www.cspinet.org/foodsafety/outbreak_alert.pdf. 
 9. TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH, PUBLIC HEALTH CRITICAL CARE 
PROGRAMS: FISCAL YEAR 2007, http://healthyamericans.org/policy/criticalcare 
(last visited Jan. 20, 2007). 
 10. Id. 
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CRITICAL ISSUES IN FOOD PROTECTION 
In a 2002 publication entitled Terrorist Threats to Food, 
Guidance for Establishing and Strengthening Prevention and 
Response Systems, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
defined food terrorism as “[a]n act or threat of deliberate 
contamination of food for human consumption with chemical, 
biological or radio-nuclear agents for the purpose of causing 
injury or death to civilian populations and/or disrupting social, 
economic or political stability.”11  In 2004, as Department of 
Health and Human Service (DHHS) Secretary Tommy 
Thompson was preparing to resign, he was asked what worried 
him most as he left office.  He responded “I, for the life of me, 
cannot understand why the terrorists have not attacked our 
food supply because it is so easy to do.”12 
Although terrorists have not attacked our food supply, 
other cases of intentional contamination of food meant for 
human consumption have been reported.  For example, in 2003, 
a supermarket employee in Michigan poisoned 200 pounds of 
ground beef with a nicotine-based insecticide, causing over 100 
people to become ill.13  In Oregon, a cult infected a local salad 
bar with Salmonella in an attempt to influence a local 
election.14  While these cases were limited to a local area, the 
national and international nature of the food trade industry 
makes it very likely that a future attack will not be so confined. 
In addition to developing adequate response plans, federal, 
state and local governments should focus on what the typical 
American can do to prepare, what Americans should do in the 
case of an attack, and what information the government should 
communicate to Americans in this type of emergency. 
The WHO has said that an effective food protection system 
should have standards for identifying risks, reducing risks, and 
 11. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, WORLD HEALTH ORG., TERRORIST THREATS TO 
FOOD: GUIDANCE FOR ESTABLISHING AND STRENGTHENING PREVENTION AND 
RESPONSE SYSTEMS, FOOD SAFETY ISSUES 4 (2002), available at 
http://www.who.int/foodsafety/publications/general/en/terrorist.pdf. 
 12. William Branigin, Mike Allen, & John Mintz, Tommy Thompson 
Resigns from HHS, Bush Asks Defense Secretary Rumsfeld to Stay, WASH. 
POST, Dec. 3, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A31377-
2004Dec3.html. 
 13. M. Boulton et al., Nicotine Poisoning After Ingestion of Contaminated 
Ground Beef – Michigan, 2003, 52 CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. 
REP. 413 (2003). 
 14. T.J. Torok et al., A Large Community Outbreak of Salmonellosis 
Caused by Intentional Contamination of Restaurant Salad Bars, 278 JAMA 
389 (1997). 
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for responding rapidly to control outbreak situations.15  Within 
the United States, it is vital that the entire food safety 
infrastructure be reviewed, including federal, state, and local 
governments, to ensure that effective systems are in place.  
Critical issues identified by the WHO include food 
contamination monitoring, food control laboratories, food import 
inspection, recall and tracing systems, food technology 
expertise, food safety risk assessment, industry alert systems, 
and agriculture alert systems.16 
Identifying risks for food contamination is the first step in 
food protection.  This can be done in several ways.  First, 
monitoring outbreaks of food borne illnesses provides 
information on both the source and agent of disease and allows 
resources to be better targeted to prevention.  This information 
also provides the baseline that may be needed to distinguish an 
intentional from an unintentional outbreak.  Ongoing food 
contaminant monitoring will track trends, identify problems 
before they affect consumers, and might provide an early 
warning system if an attack on the food supply were to occur. 
Both food and public health laboratories are essential at 
each level – local, state, and national – to provide real-time food 
monitoring, public health, and outbreak data.  Laboratories are 
essential for identifying possible infectious agents and infected 
food in an emergency.  Similarly, ensuring surge capacity, the 
ability to mobilize additional resources when needed in an 
emergency, at the state level is an important element of 
emergency response.  According to a Trust for America’s Health 
(Trust) report, these essential criteria are not being met.  The 
Trust report found that thirteen states and the District of 
Columbia are not meeting the preparedness needs outlined in 
their bioterrorism preparedness plan because they do not have 
the types of laboratories capable of assessing dangerous agents 
(i.e., bio-safety level three laboratories).17 
The Trust report further found that over 25% of states do 
not have adequate laboratory capacity to meet anticipated 
preparedness and response needs in the face of bio-threats.18  
Similarly, hospitals in nearly one-third of states lack sufficient 
capabilities to consistently and rapidly consult with infection 
 15. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 11. 
 16. Id. 
 17. HEARNE ET AL., supra note 2, at 16. 
 18. Id. at 17. 
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control experts about possible or suspected disease outbreaks.19  
States should hire or train infection control experts and identify 
second-tier and third-tier laboratories that could be made 
available if primary labs were overwhelmed or disabled during 
an emergency. 
Quickly identifying risk management options in 
emergencies is aided by both timely risk assessments and new 
food technologies.  Both functions are spread between multiple 
agencies and the private sector.  For example, developing food 
technology is shared by federal research organizations and 
private companies. Approval for use of food technology on or in 
food production often takes years, and the responsibility is 
shared between several agencies. Food safety risk assessment is 
also handled by numerous federal agencies. Risk assessment 
provides an overview of the relevant scientific information 
necessary to determine the source of a risk, as well as 
technological and risk communication options. 
Food tracking and mandatory recall systems are also 
essential tools in a food emergency. According to the WHO, 
“[t]racing systems and market recalls are thus critical in 
responding to food contamination, whether deliberate or 
inadvertent.”20  However, the two primary U.S. food regulatory 
agencies, the USDA and the FDA, rely on voluntary company 
tracking and recall systems.21  The USDA does not give 
information on the distribution of contaminated meat products 
to state public health officials unless the state officials sign a 
nondisclosure agreement. This policy means that the states are 
barred from giving consumers information about where and 
when recalled meat was sold.  If the food supply was the focus of 
a terrorist attack, the USDA’s policy would likely contribute to 
a higher rate of death and illness because it would interfere 
with the ability of consumers to obtain the knowledge necessary 
to protect them.  While the USDA recently proposed a rule to 
allow for greater disclosure, this rule has not yet been 
approved.22  The proposed rule would allow USDA to make 
publicly available lists of retail consignees of meat and poultry 
products that have been voluntarily recalled by a federally 
 19. Id. 
 20. FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 11, at 16. 
 21. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD INSPECTION AND 
SAFETY SERVICE, FSIS DIRECTIVE 8080.1, REVISION 4 (2004), available at 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/8080.1Rev4.pdf. 
 22. Availability of Lists of Retail Consignees during Meat or Poultry 
Product Recalls, 9 C.F.R. § 390.1 (2004). 
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inspected meat or poultry products establishment. 
Consumer education and response are also challenging 
during a food emergency. During smaller scale food safety 
recalls, the government has encountered unpredictable 
consumer reactions.  Sometimes the mere mention of a risk will 
trigger avoidance of a product, while at other times consumers 
completely ignore known safety hazards.  Anticipating 
responses and crafting effective communication methods to 
reach consumers are essential.  Experts say that the best 
methods for communicating with consumers during a food 
emergency include using responsible speculation, 
acknowledging uncertainty, sharing dilemmas about what to do, 
and not aiming for zero fear.23 
Industry and agriculture alert systems are considered 
essential during a food emergency, and are also important 
components of risk communication.  When properly coordinated, 
the industry and agricultural sector can provide early warning.  
Getting information from the food industry and producers to 
government decision-makers and delivering good advice from 
the government to both these sectors and to consumers is not 
only vital for minimizing economic losses from a food 
emergency, but also for maximizing the public health response. 
Our nation’s food supply is becoming increasingly global 
and includes foods grown and processed in many different 
countries.  In addition to monitoring the safety of food produced 
in the United States, federal agencies must ensure the safety of 
food imported into our country, which can be subject to 
intentional tampering.  This is a growing area of concern, as 
improvements in transportation and trade have facilitated the 
import of foods from around the world into the U.S. food supply.  
The typical supermarket now carries produce from Guatemala 
and South Africa, shrimp from Ecuador, and soups from Asia.  
Food imports have increased at least three-fold since 1985.  The 
FDA lacks new inspection resources to keep up with this 
astronomical growth.24  The FDA reportedly inspects only about 
 23. Peter M. Sandman & Jody Lanard.  Bird Flu: Communicating the 
Risk, 10 PERSP. IN HEALTH 2, 3 (2005), available at 
www.paho.org/English/DD/PIN/perspectives22.pdf. 
 24. Safety of Food Imports Before the Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, S. Committee on Government Affairs (1998) (statement William 
B. Schultz, Deputy Commissioner for Policy, Food and Drug Administration, 
Department of Health and Human Services), available at 
http://www.fda.gov/ola/1998/imported.htm (last visited Feb. 2, 2007). 
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1% of food products entering the country; a surveillance rate 
that is much too low to ensure that hazardous food does not 
enter the country.25 
The safety of imported foods is dependant on many factors 
beyond the control of our government.  While a comprehensive 
system of inspections both in the country of origin and at the 
border is effective in controlling hazards in imported meat and 
poultry products regulated by USDA, FDA lacks sufficient 
resources to inspect imported fruits, vegetables, seafood and 
dairy products. 
The failure of the FDA’s import inspection program became 
clear in 2003 when an outbreak was tied to imported Mexican 
scallions used in salsa prepared at a Pennsylvania Chi-Chi’s 
restaurant.  The scallions were contaminated with Hepatitis A 
and they infected at least 555 people and caused three deaths.26 
This outbreak was the last of four that were linked to the same 
imported green onions that occurred between August and 
November.27  After the Pennsylvania outbreak, the FDA 
inspected farms in Mexico and found abhorrent conditions for 
farm workers.  The FDA reported that workers “[l]ived in 
windowless metal shacks with no showers. Shallow trenches 
ran from an area littered with soiled diapers and other human 
waste, downhill to onion fields and a packaging house. . . .”28  
While the FDA never conclusively linked the conditions on one 
farm to the outbreak of Hepatitis A, it still demonstrates how 
closely connected our world has become—so close that the safety 
of salsa at a local restaurant relies on production practices (or 
security measures) 2,000 miles away. 
IMPROVING EMERGENCY RESPONSE 
In its 2002 publication Terrorist Threats to Food, the WHO 
stated that “[a]n effective emergency response . . . should 
 25. Food Safety Overview of Food Safety and Inspection Service and Food 
and Drug Administration Expenditures Before the S. Comm. On Agriculture, 
Nutrition, and Forestry, 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Lawrence J. 
Dyckman, Director, Food and Agriculture Issues Resources, Community, and 
Economic Development Division), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/archive/2000/rc00300t.pdf. 
 26. V. Dato et al,, Hepatitis A Outbreak Associated with Green Onions at 
Restaurant- Monaco, Pennsylvania, 2003, 52 CDC MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY 
WKLY. REP. 1155, 1155 (2003). 
 27. S. Boodman, Raw Menace: Major Hepatitis A Outbreak Tied to Green 
Onions, WASH POST, Nov. 25, 2003, at F.01. 
 28. Joe Mandak, FDA finds squalor at Mexican farm in hepatitis probe, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS STATE AND LOCAL WIRE, May 7, 2005. 
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include links [to] law enforcement . . . agencies, food recall 
systems, risk assessment specialists and the food industry as 
well as the more traditional sectors of health care providers, 
laboratories and emergency services.”29  Such a closely 
coordinated system would likely produce both practical and 
effective results during an emergency, but only if the outbreak 
is identified early on, the contaminated food can be located, and 
the channels of communication are open.  To ensure prompt 
identification of intentional contamination, outbreak tracking 
needs to be standardized, fully reported, and prioritized.  Once 
identified, officials must develop a clear and effective response 
plan for removing contaminated foods from grocery store aisles 
and home refrigerators.  But all of this requires a public health 
network at the local, county, and state levels that work together 
with fully-funded and staffed federal agencies. 
Another option for improving emergency response is for 
Congress to enact a modern food law administered by a single 
food safety agency.  In 2006 the USDA received $837 million to 
inspect meat and poultry.  This is more than twice the amount 
that the FDA received for food-related inspections.30  These 
resources can not be reallocated in an emergency, due to legal 
restriction and the problem that the foods safety programs exist 
in two distinct agencies.  A 1998 NAS report called for the 
consolidation of food-safety responsibility under a single 
statute, a single budget, and a single leader.31 This report 
concluded that the “current fragmented regulatory structure is 
not well equipped to meet the current challenges.”32  This 
approach has been recommended also by the GAO and many 
others.33 
Addressing these issues is not a problem that the United 
States faces alone. With the globalization of the world’s food 
supply comes the realization that risks for food contamination 
are more challenging.  To empower consumers in the 
 29. See FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, supra note 11, at 25-26. 
 30. Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and 
Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-97, 119 Stat. 2120 
(2005). 
 31. Institute of Medicine, supra note 4. 
 32. Id. at 12. 
 33. Federal Food Safety and Security System: Fundamental Restructuring 
is Needed to Address Fragmentation and Overlap Before the Subcomm. On 
Civil Serv. and Agency Organization, H. Comm. On Government Reform, 108th 
Cong. 4 (statement of Lawrence J. Dyckman, Director, Natural Resources and 
Environment, available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04588t.pdf. 
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international market, in 2003 the Center for Science in the 
Public interest (CSPI) formed Safe Food International (SFI) in 
conjunction with the WHO and the United Nations’ Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO).34  SFI is a coalition of 
consumer organizations from around the world, which aims to 
unify and focus the efforts of consumer organizations to ensure 
a safer food supply.  In June 2005, SFI held a conference in 
Geneva, Switzerland with consumer groups from twenty-two 
developing nations in order to create The Guidelines for 
Consumer Organizations to Promote National Food Safety 
Systems.35  These guidelines provide consumer non-
governmental organizations with a framework for promoting 
the elements of an effective food safety program.36  These 
elements include: 
• Food law and regulations, 
• Food-borne disease surveillance and investigation 
systems, 
• Food control management, 
• Inspections services, 
• Recall and tracking systems, 
• Food monitoring laboratories, 
• Information, education, communication and training, 
• Funding and affordability of the national food safety 
program.37 
Promoting these elements in both wealthy and developing 
nations will provide an important oversight for assuring that 
each national food safety program addresses key problems, 
helps minimize food-related deaths and illnesses, and deters the 
use of food as a target of intentional contamination. 
CONCLUSION 
The gaps and inefficiencies documented above demonstrate 
 34. Safe Food International is a nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
project by CSPI. It was started under the direction of Caroline Smith DeWaal 
in 2003. CSPI also founded the International Association of Consumer Food 
Organizations. 
 35. See SAFE FOOD INT’L, GUIDELINES FOR CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS TO 
PROMOTE NATIONAL FOOD SAFETY SYSTEMS 2 (2005), available at 
http://www.safefoodinternational.org/guidelines_for_consumer_organizations.p
df. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Caroline Smith DeWaal & Gonzalo R. Guerrero Brito, Safe Food 
International: A Blueprint for Better Global Food Safety, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
393 (2005). 
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that until we address the problems inherent in the food-safety 
regulatory structure, we will not be able to achieve a risk-based 
food-safety system capable of responding effectively to food 
emergencies. The steps for preventing bioterrorism do not 
require grand schemes and great minds. Instead, they require 
strong national programs, outbreak surveillance, and effective 
and honest public communication. Security measures in the 
food industry are our first line of defense against bioterrorism 
and have the primary role of preventing intentional and 
unintentional contamination.  However, to be effective, industry 
programs require government monitoring and auditing. 
The fractured federal food safety infrastructure makes 
coordination very difficult, and makes very real the possibility 
that a Katrina-like response could follow a food emergency.  
Therefore, many external organizations have made calls for 
restructuring the federal government’s food safety system. Over 
the last twenty years, expert panels from the White House and 
Congress to the National Academy of Sciences and the General 
Accounting Office have all reached similar conclusions. 
It is clearly not news to anyone that statutes written before 
the Ford Model T was driven are not suited to address modern 
issues like bioterrorism, mad cow disease, or even common food 
borne bacteria. If a terrorist was to strike the U.S. food supply, 
consumer confidence in the government’s fractured food safety 
programs would plummet as fast as confidence in airport 
security did following September 11, 2001. Dr. John Bailar, the 
chairman of the NAS committee called for a more unified food 
safety structure, and remarked that “[w]hen bioterrorism is 
added to the mix, the case for prompt and sweeping change 
becomes compelling. While additional tinkering with the details 
of our food safety system might be helpful, the consolidation of 
responsibilities, authorities, and resources for food safety into a 
single high-level agency is critical.”38 Today, a unified agency 
operating under a modern food safety statute is truly an issue of 
national security. 
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